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The Romanian economy - four years after  









The first four years of Romania’s membership confirmed that the accession to 
the  EU  had,  overall,  positive  effects  on  the  economy.  Although  the  pace  of 
structural reforms had slowed down after 2007, they picked up again after the 
start of financial crisis, at the end of 2008. Households’ wealth and purchasing 
power have increased despite the recent drop over the last two years. Looking 
ahead, Romania’s economy will need to enhance its competitiveness and pursue 
a  growth  model  which  would  make  it  less  dependent  on  external  shocks. 
Economic strategies leading to both physical and human capital accumulation 
would need to be clearly defined and supported by all political parties. With 
monetary policy aimed at maintaining price stability, fiscal policy would have a 
defining role in preserving and enhancing competitiveness. The pursuance of 
sound fiscal and monetary policies would be paramount in achieving sustained 
growth in the years to come. 
 
Keywords: Romania, EU convergence, monetary and fiscal policy 
 




On  January  1,  2007  Romania joined  the  European  Union  (EU),  seven 
years after it had started accession talks. Romania’s EU membership yielded 
quite a few benefits as deeper integration of product, labour and money markets 
led  to  increased  wealth  and  capital  accumulation.  On  the  other  hand,  some 
decisions such as the required full liberalisation of capital account facilitated the 
build-up of disequilibria in domestic asset markets during the post EU accession 
years. Daianu et al (2004), among others, drew attention to the risks such an 
action carried and suggested a more gradual approach towards capital account 
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liberalisation
1. Therefore, assessing the exact benefits and costs of the EU 
accession taking the accession date as a reference point, would prove to be 
misleading for at least two reasons. First, important policy decisions were made 
prior to Romania’s accession to the EU
2. These policies had a deep impact on 
the  subsequent  evolution of  the  economy,  in  the  medium  term.  Second,  any 
inferences drawn are likely to be distorted due to the effects of the current global 
financial crisis. The width and breadth of the current crisis are large enough, 
compared to historical standards, to render any conclusions on the EU accession 
benefits biased. It is for these reasons  that, when it comes to comparing the 
evolution of macro variables, the analysis considers a larger time span, and looks 
at the 2003-2010 period
3.   
The literature addressing Romania’s performance after EU accession is 
rather limited. There are regular reports on international institutions such as the 
European Commission (EC) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which 
present latest developments
4.  A few analyses such as Pauwels (2009) offer a 
macroeconomic view but they are primarily based on data prior   to the EU 
accession. There are several studies which focus on specific sectors or the 
evolution of specific variables over a time period.    
The individual sections in the paper address issues related to general 
macroeconomic  aspects  and  the  economic  poli cies  pursued
5.  The  paper  is 
structured as follows. The next section looks at the general economic conditions 
in Romania. Section 3 and 4 address the issues of fiscal and monetary policy 
respectively. Finally, section 5 highlights some challenges and opport unities 
ahead.     
 
2. General economic conditions 
The last economic growth cycle started a few years prior to Romania’s EU 
accession, in 2001, and was based primarily on consumption and construction-
oriented investments, mostly in the residential sector. As Graph 1 below shows, 
                                                 
1 Some important preconditions for a full capital account liberalisation were missing. 
Among these were the incomplete restructuring of the financial system, the insufficient 
level of macroeconomic stability and the absence of a fully operational antitrust policy.   
2 Besides the decision to fully liberalise the capital account there was the introduction of 
flat tax in 2005. 
3 Thus it includes periods of similar length of four years on either side of the accession 
date.  
4 See for instance IMF(2008), IMF(2011) or EC(2010), EC(2009), EC(2010a). 
5 There are other dimensions of the EU membership such as the impact on migration, 
education, agriculture, and infrastructure or in the area of freedom, security and justice 
as well as the influence on decision-making procedure and the EU policy and legal acts 
within European institutions. These aspects, while extremely important, do not make the 
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the increase in domestic consumption was the main engine of growth up until 
2008. Household investments in both durable goods and housing rose fast after 
2003 as the share of these in households’ total wealth was low. The increase in 
demand  for  durable  goods  and  housing  was  facilitated  by  increased  credit 
availability and rising purchasing power.   
The boom continued until the autumn of 2008, when the effects of the 
global economic downturn, triggered by the 2007 US subprime crisis, impacted 
negatively  on  Romania’s  economic  growth.  Large  existing  macroeconomic 
imbalances  were  penalised  by  investors  as  global  liquidity  dried  up  and 
uncertainty  rose  sharply  in  the  world  financial  markets.  International  credit 
rating agencies reacted, with two of the main three agencies, Standard & Poor’s 
and Fitch, downgrading Romania’s rating to non-investment grade status. 
Graph 1. GDP demand components, annual real - % change 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Even  so,  Romania’s  GDP/capita,  expressed  in  PPS  terms,  has  grown 
relatively fast. It rose from 26.1% of EU-27 in year 2000, when Romania started 
EU accession talks to 38.3% at the end of 2006, prior to the country entering the 
EU, reached a peak of 47% in 2008 before falling slightly to 45% of EU-27 in 
2010  (see  Graph  2).  The  rise  in  GDP/capita  is  in  line  with  the  economic 
convergence theory whereby countries with lower incomes would benefit from 
the EU accession via increased productivity.  
The increase in purchasing power is consistent with economic theories of 
growth whereby in an economic area with free movement of capital and labour, 
income should tend to converge across member countries. In Romania, however, 
average  wage  in  the  economy  rose  at  a  pace  much  faster  than  justified  by 
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membership period. Nominal net wage increased from EUR 245 at the end of 
2006 to EUR 334 at the end of 2010 although over the last three years it actually 
fell slightly.    
Graph 2. Romania, GDP/capita in PPS, EU-27=100 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Strong  wage  rises,  an  increased  volume  of  remittances  and  a  rapid 
expansion of non-governmental domestic credit pushed private consumption on 
an unsustainable path, leading to an overheated economy. In fact, excess demand 
accelerated sharply even after 2004, when Romania’s EU accession become a 
certainty, going into double digits and reaching a peak of 15.7% of the GDP in 
the first quarter of 2008. This dynamic was also helped by the introduction of the 
16% flat tax on income and company’s profits back in 2005. In retrospect, this 
had the negative downside of operating pro-cyclically. 
Table  1  below  provides  an  overview  of  the  behaviour  of  selected 
macroeconomic variables for the chosen period. As it can be seen, GDP growth 
rose much faster in the four years leading to accession, averaging 6.4% annually, 
than during the membership period, when it rose by an yearly average of just 
1.2%. While the latest result is clearly influenced by the effects of the crisis it 
also  highlights the  diminished  capacity  of  the  Romanian economy  to  absorb 
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Table 1. Selected macroeconomic indicators, Romania 2003-2010 






GDP Growth,%  5.2  8.4  4.2  7.9  6.0  7.3  -7.1  -1.3  6.4  1.2 
Consumption 
Growth,%  8.3  11.2  9.7  10.1  10.3  8.7  -7.8  -2.1  9.8  2.3 
Savings Rate,% of 
GDP  16  13.9  16.5  16.1  17.3  19.7  21.1  22.3  15.6  20.1 
Investment Rate, % 
of GDP  24.6  25.3  26.3  27.3  30.1  31.3  25.3  26.5  25.9  28.3 
Nominal Net Wage 
Growth,%  25.4  22.5  23.7  16.8  21.0  22.9  7.7  1.8  22.1  13.4 
Real Credit 







Inflation, Avg.,%  15.4  12.0  9.1  6.7  4.8  7.9  5.6  6.1  10.8  6.1 
Unemployment rate, 
%,eop, ILO  8.5  8  6.7  7  6.2  5.8  7.5  7.3  7.6  6.7 
C/A Deficit, % of 





11.6  -4.2  -4.1  -8.3  -8.5 
Trade Balance, % of 
GDP  -7.5  -8.7  -9.9  -12  -
14.6 
-
13.7  -5.8  -4.9  -9.5  -9.8 
Source: IMF various Country Reports, NBR and Author’s Calculations 
 
Ever since Romania acquired the status of a functioning market economy, 
prior to 2007, the pace of structural reforms slowed down
6 visibly. This, in turn, 
weakened considerably the economy’s ability to build productive capacities able 
to compete internationally. Although investment rates actually rose during the 
membership period, averaging 28.3% of GDP, a large part of these were directed 
towards  non-productive  areas  such  as  residential  sector  construction.  This, 
together with private consumption were the main engines of growth until the end 
of  2008,  when  a  collapse  in  both  led  to  an abrupt  fall in economic  growth.  
Except for the last two years, nominal wage growth was far above its sustainable 
trend  value.  Real  wage  growth
7  was rising at an average of 11.3% annually 
during  the  pre -accession  period  and  slowed  down  to  7.3%  during  the 
membership period. Unemployment
8 had been on a downward trend until the 
crisis effects were felt in the economy, in 2009. The fall in unemployment rate 
together with higher migration put an upward pressure on real wages
9. This trend 
was reversed after 2009 when jobs, in Romania and across Europe, became 
                                                 
6 As acknowledged by the IMF and EU country reports. 
7 Computed here as nominal wage growth less CPI inflation. 
8 As measured by International Labour Organisation (ILO) standards. 
9 Although real wage growth has been high in most non-member states, it was more so in 
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scarce. And, as it can be seen from Table 1, the latest result was particularly 
influenced by the crisis years when real wage
10 growth turned even negative
11. 
This has helped the economy to regain some of the competitiveness
12 it lost 
during the first two years of EU membership
13 (see Graph 3 below).    
Graph 3. Competitiveness, REER and ULC, annual change,% 
 
Source: IMF and Eurostat 
 
Using the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) approach, Romania’s 
competitiveness yields slightly different results. Based on this, the appreciation 
of REER during the pre-accession period continued throughout the first year of 
the EU membership. These losses were partially reversed in 2008 and 2009. 
However,  the  REER  approach  has  its  drawbacks  as,  at  times,  the  NBR 
intervened  in  the  foreign  exchange  markets  to  stabilise  the  RON/EUR  rate.  
According to Vitek (2011), the assessment of REER at the end of 2010 does not 
seem  to  suggest  significant  exchange  rate  misalignment.  The  three 
                                                 
10 Here real wages were calculated using the CPI. Bosworth et al. (1994) and Feldstein 
(2008) show that the choice of deflator as price deflator for real wages and productivity 
allows consistency in the data. They suggest that the GDP deflator is the correct price to 
be used in the construction of real wages. However, the choice of a deflator is unlikely to 
change much the inferences made here as the trend is the same in both cases.   
11 This occurred due to a fall in demand for labour as well as the increase in inflation, 
mainly due to the VAT raise in July 2010. 
12 Using the Unit Labour Cost (ULC) approach. 
13  Grafe  and  Wyplosz  (1997)  show  that  transition  countries  generally  started 
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methodologies  employed
14  yield estimated ranging from undervaluation of  -
0.1% to overvaluation of 5.2%.  
Romania’s attractiveness as a destination of capital flows is clearly visible 
during the pre-accession years (see Graph 4 below). FDI amounted to an annual 
average of 7% of GDP during the pre-accession period and only 4.4% of GDP 
between 2007 and 2010. 
Graph 4. FDI in Romania over the 2003-2010 period 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using NBR data 
 
However, in nominal terms, over the four years, annual average FDI was 
slightly higher after Romania gained EU membership, EUR 5.6 bn. versus EUR 
5.1  bn.  during  the  pre-accession  period;  this  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
privatisation receipts were overall lower after 2007.  
The consumption boom and the appreciation of the RON against the EUR 
between 2004 and 2007 exacerbated disequilibria of both internal and external 
balances. The C/A deficit reached a peak of 13.9% of GDP at the end of 2007 
and, apart from being on an unsustainable path, was clearly exposed to a reversal 
of  capital  flows.  (Similarly,  the  cyclically  adjusted  budget  deficit  widened 
continuously over the same period – see next section). Thus, the emergence of 
the crisis found the Romanian economy in a difficult position for rolling over 
debt and forced the authorities to resort to IMF’s help to secure the necessary 
funds for financing current account and budgetary needs. The 2-year Stand-By 
                                                 
14 The macroeconomic balance approach, equilibrium real exchange rate regressions and 
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Agreement (SBA) worth EUR 12.9 bn
15, signed in May 2009 was subsequently 
extended for another two years
16, until the spring of 2013. The objectives of the 
SBA were three-fold: first, to smooth out the effects of the sharp drop in private 
capital inflows. Second, to mitigate pressures brought about by both external and 
fiscal imbalances while strengthening the financial sector. And third, to ease 
pressures on the exchange rate which could have caused major balance sheet 
effects on the corporate and household sectors, which would have deepened the 
recession and imposed additional strains on the banking sector.  
The criteria set out in the agreements envisaged the adoption of structural 
reforms aimed at sorting out budgetary imbalances and ensuring the long -term 
sustainability of public finances. The adoption of the fiscal respon sibility law 
brought about a more disciplined way of pursuing fiscal policy while limiting 
public sector wage increases. There are other reforms which are currently under 
way, namely sorting out the arrears of central and local governments, reforming 
the  health  care system,  restructuring  ANAF
17,  and  implementing  structural 
reforms  in  the  domestic  energy  sector  through  privatisations,  management 
change and energy price liberalisation.  
Overall, the IMF agreements proved to be beneficial for the economy
18. 
They enhanced Romania’s credibility abroad and provided a timely framework 
for implementing a coherent programme of macroeconomic policies. The latter 
was an important element in reducing macroeconomic imbalances as Romanian 
political parties generally lacked the necessary economic knowledge and vision 
to deal with these aspects in the midst of the crisis.    
The macroeconomic picture is an outcome of the economic policies undertaken 
over the last years. The next two sections highlight the relevant changes in fiscal 
and  monetary  policy  respectively  and  comment  on  their  implications  on  the 
economy.      
 
 
                                                 
15 The IMF support has been coordinated with that of the EU and the World Bank, 
bringing the total amount available to Romania to EUR 19.5 Bn. 
16 As a Precautionary SBA worth EUR 3.6  Bn. in conjunction with additional EUR 1.8 
Bn. support from EU and the World Bank.    
17  Agentia  Nationala  de  Administrare  Fiscala  (The  National  Agency  of  Fiscal 
Administration) – the institution responsible for tax collection.  
18 Some views hold that the first IMF programme was controversial as it allowed direct 
financing of the budgetary deficit. But this exceptional move occurred only once, at a 
time when the need to roll-over public debt occurred during a period of high tension on 
international markets.  As such, it could be seen as a one -off bridge loan aimed at 
maintaining public borrowing costs at minimum levels and thus aiding government’s 
efforts in achieving fiscal consolidation.   THE ROMANIAN ECONOMY FOUR YEARS AFTER THE EU ACCESSION   39 
 
3. Fiscal policy, from a pro-cyclical to a contractionary stance 
Prior to the EU accession, the obligation to fulfil the Maastricht criteria 
disciplined  government  spending.  Back  in  2003,  the  authorities  were  even 
running a primary balance surplus. At the end of 2006, the general government 
budget recorded a -2.2% deficit, but even this low figure provided a distorted 
picture on the state of public finances due to the fact that the economic growth 
was above its potential. The cyclically adjusted deficit was already running at -
3.8% and was about to embark on a rising trend in the years ahead (see Graph 5 
below). It reached a peak of -9.3% of GDP in 2008 before falling to -5.6% in 
2010, after serious budget cuts, implemented as a part of the IMF conditionality, 
forced the deficit down. 
Even though fiscal policy was more disciplined prior to EU accession, it 
lacked  a  clear long-term  strategy  which  would address the  fiscal imbalances 
built up over time. The financial crisis has provided an opportunity to address 
these issues and, although several steps forward have been made, there is more 
to be done if the probability of fiscal slippages is to be reduced in the future.  
Graph 5. General government deficit, % of GDP 
 
Source: European Commission and Ministry of Finance 
 
There  were four  main  causes  which led to the present  situation.  First, 
between 2005 and 2008 fiscal policy was notoriously pro-cyclical, the budget 
deficit widened as the economy was growing above potential. With government 
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which were less productive, especially public sector wages
19 and consumption. 
  Second,  political  business  cycle  played  a  very  important  role  in 
deepening the budget deficit. Prior to Parliamentary elections in the autumn of 
2008,  government  overspent  an  estimated  2.3%  of  GDP,  pushing  the  deficit 
above its 3.1% target
20. Subsequently, the financing needs necessary  to cover 
this gap were added to those caused by the fall in government revenues due to 
the slowdown in economic growth. Together, they imposed a massive fiscal 
adjustment during both 2009 and 2010
21. Third, there was a  lack of foresight 
from the authorities. Fiscal profligacy is a characteristic of governments which 
have  a  poor  foresight.  As  it  is  often  the  case  in  emerging  and  transition 
economies, fiscal policies adopted in favourable times appear to be implemented 
with a view that positive shocks are permanent
22. Attention to cyclical adjusted 
budget deficits was overlooked by Romanian authorities. Moreover,  once the 
economic sentiment turned around, the emerging gap in fiscal finances posed 
daunting adjustment efforts. Fourth, the successive  increases in pension point 
pushed pensions spending beyond the level affordable in the long term. The 
sustained increases in public pensions point were the trigger which precipitated 
the public sector pension’s crisis. Between 2006 and 2009, the pension point 
more than trebled in real terms. Such an outstanding increase in relative terms 
cannot be sustained unless exceptional productivity increases make such pay-
outs possible – an improbable scenario, given the magnitude of the increases 
required
23. 
                                                 
19 For instance, between 2000 and 2008, in a period when European GDP was positive 
and on a slight upward trend, Romania was the only country in Europe which increased 
significantly its share of wage expenditure (in total government expenditure), from 21% 
in 2000 to 27% in 2008. 
20 In fact, ‘political business cycles’ have been the norm in Romania over the last two 
decades. According to Nordhaus' (1975) original model of the 'political business cycle', 
politicians stimulate aggregate demand before elections to increase growth and reduce 
unemployment,  in  order  to maximize  their  popularity  and  the  likelihood  of  their  re-
election.     
21 Fiscal policy became contractionary in 2009 when government spending, especially 
public sector wage costs, was cut. Tax increases followed in 2010, with VAT going up 
by 5 percentage points to 24%.     
22 Inflated revenue forecasts were used as a way to artificially create margins for higher 
spending increases. 
See for instance Milesi -Feretti and Moriyama (2004). Overly favourable growth and 
revenue  assumptions  help  opportunistic  governments  to  avoid  the  political  cost 
associated with the implementation of consolidation measures. 
23 The financing of pension expenditures have been made more difficult by the pension 
reform, initiated a few years ago, which requires an increased share of total social 
security contributions to flow into private pensions funds in the years to come. THE ROMANIAN ECONOMY FOUR YEARS AFTER THE EU ACCESSION   41 
 
While the budget deficit pictures a snapshot of government’s solvency, 
the path of public debt offers a long-term perspective of the sustainability of 
public finances. In the long term a country is perceived as being solvent as long 
as  the  rate  of  growth  on  public  debt  remains  lower  that  the  interest  rate.  
  Otherwise,  public  debt  will  be  growing  fast  up  to  a  point  where  the 
government will fail to find a buyer for any yield it would be willing to offer on 
its debt. Until the end of 2006 this condition was largely fulfilled in Romania. 
However,  in  the  subsequent  years  the  growth  rate  of  public  debt  rose 
dramatically. Starting from 2007, the annual rate of growth of public debt rose 
from 30% to 35% in 2009, before falling to 31% in 2010. These rates were far 
above the interest rate prevailing at the time. Moreover, the funds borrowed 
were extensively used to cover current expenditure, i.e. pensions, wages and 
government consumption and to a far less extent they were aimed at capital 
expenditure.  It  is  clear  that  such  a  policy  cannot  continue  without  having  a 
destabilising  effect  on  public  finances  in  the  future.  The  adoption  of  Fiscal 
Responsibility Law in 2010
24 was aimed at making fiscal policy more forward-
looking while increasing transparency
25. But, containing the budget deficit  and 
reducing  the  public  sector  debt  on  a  sustainable  basis  would  require  the 
implementation of more structural changes in the economy.     
 
4. Monetary policy, between inflation and exchange rate stability 
Even before Romania’s EU accession the task of monetary policy was not 
an easy one. As a precondition to joining the EU, Romania had to liberalise its 
capital account, a move which, in retrospect, should have been prepared more 
thoroughly
26. The ensuing inflows of foreign capital into an economy with a low 
level of financial deepening
27 prevented an optimal response from the monetary 
authorities. And, the resulting appreciation of the domestic currency led to the 
accumulation of disequilibria in both asset and labour markets. 
There can be identified several distinct moments which were illustrative 
for the way monetary policy was conducted. First, during the pre -accession 
                                                 
24 Law 69/2010, available at: http://codfiscal.money.ro/legea-692010-legea-
responsabilitatii-fiscal-bugetare/. 
25 This required setting up a binding medium-term budgetary framework, establish limits 
on budget revisions during a given year and use fiscal rules to improve budgetary 
implementation.  It  also  led  to  the  creation  of  Fiscal  Council  which  provides  an 
independent opinion on the budgetary strategy and processes.    
26 The analysis of the costs entailed by Romanian capital account liberalisation have 
been very limited. More should have been done at the time by estimating the effects such 
a decision would have on l ong term economic growth and development as well as the 
implications for the financial sector.  
27 Financial deepening, measured as the ratio M3/GDP was 40% at the end of 2010, 
compared to little over 100% in the euro zone. 42    Laurian LUNGU 
 
period, in August 2005, the National Bank of Romania (NBR) moved towards 
inflation targeting. This represented a radical departure from the previous policy 
and entailed the use of new instruments to achieve its objective. Although the 
inflation  targeting  policy  was  more  transparent,  it  also  faced  a  number  of 
challenges, especially at the operational level, as the transmission channel of 
monetary policy was not functioning optimally. The NBR missed its inflation 
targets for a number of years (see Graph 6 below) as exchange rate pass-through 
effects dominated the inflation path.  
Graph 6. Annual inflation and interest rates, % 
 
Source: NBR Monthly Bulletins 
 
Monetary base, M0, started to expand more rapidly, growing from 30% at 
the end of 2004 to over 50% in 2006 as money demand rose. M2 was growing as 
well, albeit at a slightly tempered pace. During this period, the macroeconomic 
conditions for rapid domestic credit growth were largely in place
28. Commercial 
banks  operating  in  Romania  were  fighting  for  market  share,  thus  taking 
advantage of increasing household demand for borrowing funds. Between 2003 
and 2007, the average real wage growth rate o utpaced household consumption 
growth  by  1.4%.  As  a  consequence,  a  higher  level  of  income  increased 
household credit affordability. 
                                                 
28 One explanation for such a rapid rise in domestic credit growth is the increase in 
GDP/capita.  A  higher  GDP/capita,  associated  with  increased  economic  development, 
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The  second  moment  refers  to  the  post-accession  period  when  the 
economy’s elevated growth prospects continued to attract high capital inflows. 
The supply of credit reflected buoyant capital inflows channelled mainly through 
the  banking  system
29. By now, the pace of non -government domestic credit 
growth reached triggered a response from the NBR, which adopted several 
measures to try to stem this increase in non governmental credit. In mid 2007 it 
embarked on a tightening cycle, raising both its benchmark policy rate, from 
7.25%  in  June  2007  to  10.25%  by  the  end  of  2008,  as  well  as  reserve 
requirements ratio. Apart from these quantitative measures, the NBR adopted a 
string of prudential measures aimed at limiting both household debt exposure as 
well as bank lending
30. Increasing inflows of foreign capital, driven by high 
interest rates and potential gains in the property market, led to  a continuous 
appreciation of the RON. This, in turn led to an acceleration of imports, which 
rose faster than exports, widening the current account deficit to  -12.3% at the 
end of 2008. 
There were several risks associated with the existing level of credit  
expansion. One of them pertained to credit currency composition. With the 
opening of the capital account in 2004, household preferences started to switch 
away from RON denominated to foreign exchange denominated loans. At the 
end of January 2008, the share of borrowing in domestic currency for both firms 
and households fell to around 45% of total credit. The rapid rise in foreign 
currency lending to households could have left banks exposed indirectly to the 
exchange  rate  risk.  This  happened  because  househo lds  were,  in  general, 
unhedged and Romanian financial markets were relatively shallow. In terms of 
annual growth rates, household demand for RON -denominated credit seems to 
have been influenced to some extent by changes in regulatory measures imposed 
by the NBR. 
The third moment involves the NBR’s response during the current crisis, 
starting from the end of 2008. Over this period, the monetary policy proved to be 
supportive of fiscal needs. Although the National Bank of Romania officially 
targeted  inflation,  it  also  paid  a  heightened  attention  to  the  exchange  rate 
developments – as part of its financial stability objective. During 2009, when 
government financing needs were high, the NBR reduced its foreign exchange 
minimum  reserve  requirements  from  40%  to  25%.  This  monetary  loosening 
allowed domestic banks to buy public debt. The NBR’s benchmark interest rate 
was lowered gradually from 10.25% in 2009 to 6.25% at the end of 2010. The 
growth rate of M0 dropped to zero at the end of 2010, after being in negative 
                                                 
29 The capital account liberalisation played , undoubtdely, an important part. The effects 
of global low interest rates, prevailing at the time, exacerbated the inflows of capital 
which were in search of a higher yield.    
30 For instance NBR (2006). 44    Laurian LUNGU 
 
territory throughout that year. As the demand for credit collapsed the extended 
measure of money, M2, fell to 6% annually.   
The  financial  sector  continued  to  remain  relatively  sound  although  an 
escalation of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is likely to have repercussions 
on  the  Romanian  banks’  balance  sheets  operating  in  Romania.  One  of  their 
important advantages however, was that these had little exposure to the so-called 
toxic assets. The main risk to banks’ balance sheets came via non-performing 
loans and the exchange rate effect, although the latter had been greatly reduced 
following the BNR’s preference for smoothing out fluctuations in exchange rate. 
The banking system was adequately capitalised during this period, with the NBR 
supplying  the  necessary  liquidity.  Most  banks  were  able  to  cope  with  the 
economic downturn in spite of increasing non-performing loan ratios
31.  
Overall, the monetary policy was rather prudent over the latest period. 
Although the economy was contracting abruptly in 2009, the NBR’s benchmark 
interest rate was only gradually reduced. With inflation falling, real interest rates 
in the economy were too high to help firms ease their borrowing needs. The 
prudent approach of monetary policy can also be traced through the evolution of 
the  exchange  rate.  Although  the  NBR  targets  inflation,  concerns  about large 
swings in exchange rate made the NBR adopt a pro-active stance, sometimes 
resorting  to  foreign  exchange  market  interventions  in  order  to  stabilise  the 
exchange rate. 
 
5. Looking ahead: how to improve economic policy 
The  first  four  years  of  Romania’s  membership  confirmed  that  the 
economy is still in need of adjustment. The accession to the EU had, overall, 
positive  effects  on  the  economy  as  the  external  pressure  of  international 
institutions made possible the implementation of economic reforms. Although 
the pace of these had slowed down after 2007, they picked up again after the 
start  of  financial  crisis,  at  the  end  of  2008.  The  households’  wealth  and 
purchasing power have increased despite the recent drop over the last two years.  
Romania’s economy will need to enhance its competitiveness and pursue 
a growth model which would make it less dependent on external shocks. The 
current crisis highlighted the risk posed by an economy dependent on residential 
construction and private consumption boom. Economic strategies leading to both 
physical and human capital accumulation would need to be clearly defined and 
supported  by  all  political  parties.  In  fact,  starting  with  2008,  there  was  a 
                                                 
31  The  so-called  Vienna  Initiative,  through  which  banks  pledged  to  maintain  their 
exposure  to  Romania  (and  other  transition  economies),  played  an  important  part  in 
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deepening  lack  of  communication  among  the  three  main  political  parties
32. 
Political fight led to extreme actions which prevented reaching a consensus over 
general economic policies required to stabilise the economy. Thus, important 
decisions which could have reduced the fall in output were delayed excessively.  
Physical infrastructure, energy and agriculture are only a few sectors 
which have a large growth potential. With monetary policy aimed at maintaining 
price stability, fiscal policy would have a defining  role in preserving and 
enhancing competitiveness. The pursuance of sound fiscal and monetary policies 
would be paramount in achieving sustained growth in the years to come. In this 
respect, there are several aspects which are worth mentioning.  
First, it is well acknowledged that strengthened fiscal institutions can play 
a key role in support of fiscal consolidation. The credibility of the Ministry of 
Finance (MF) has been damaged by the actions it took during the crisis. Namely, 
decisions to raise VAT
33  or  cut public sector employees wages were taken 
hastily, without proper analyses of the implications these would have on the 
wider economy. Prior to that, the MF introduced in 2009 a minimum tax
34, 
payable by all business whether or not they made a profit. Aga in, this was 
effectively introduced overnight and it proved to be ill -timed, deeply counter-
productive and was dropped in 2010.    
Romania will need to enhance the formulation and implementation of its 
fiscal  framework,  fiscal  monitoring  and  reporting  alon g  with  spelling  out 
explicitly budgeting practices along with improving government assets and 
liabilities management. Given the existing imbalances, the necessary fiscal 
adjustments would have to come primarily from fiscal structural reforms
35. 
Although  the  set  up  of  the  Independent  Fiscal  Council  -  in  charge  with 
monitoring  and  expressing  a  view  on  budgetary  developments  -  was  an 
important step forward in enhancing public sector transparency, t here is a need 
for more efforts in this respect . This could mean the pursuance of a sensible 
fiscal policy rule that accommodates cyclical fluctuations.  
                                                 
32 Political tensions reached a peak prior to November 2008 Presidential elections, in a 
period when the Romanian economy was starting to feel strongly the effects of the crisis. 
The Romanian currency, the Leu was under attack a month before and the economy was 
facing  the  prospects  of  capital  outflows  at  a  time  when  it  needed  to  finance  large 
budgetary and current account deficits.     
33 The VAT rise, from 19% to 24%, became effective as July 1, 2010 and was taken a 
few days before that date.  
34  The government Ordinance OUG 34/2009, available at  http://www.dreptonline.ro/ 
legislatie/grila_impozit_forfetar_2010.php 
35  For instance, IMF (2010) lists a series of actions which could be taken such as: 
reforms aimed at stabilising entitlement-spending-to-GDP ratio; measures to lower other 
primary spending in relation to GDP; or increased revenue, for instance by b roadening 
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Second,  the  accumulation  of  knowledge  at  the  level  of  public  sectors 
decision  makers  responsible  with  the  policy  formulation  and  implementation 
would be paramount. This would allow the build up of a solid base of human 
capital which would inflict more professionalism in the fiscal policy formulation 
process while allowing more predictability to changes in fiscal policy. 
Third, the political cycle of the economy should be avoided. The political 
business cycle has been the norm over the last two decades. With monetary 
policy outside government’s political control, fiscal policy must be pursued in a 
multi-annual  budgetary  framework  and  avoid  being  pro-cyclical.  This  would 
ensure not only a pursuit of a more transparent and coherent set of co-ordinated 
economic  policies  but  would  prevent  the  political  parties  in  power  from 
implementing policies that would suit their immediate needs. Fiscal policy must 
be  devised  in  such  a  way  as  to  support  monetary  policy  with  its  inflation 
targeting  objective  and  also  be  sustainable  in  the  medium  term.  Reducing 
political  influence  on  the  decision  processes  of  public  sector  expenditure 
programmes is likely to enhance wealth for the average citizen. For instance, 
there  are  question  marks  over  the  high  costs  of  large  infrastructure  projects 
which are often awarded to companies belonging to the political clientele. Such 
measures would also have large positive spill over effects in the economy, by 
building trust in public sector policies and allocating capital more efficiently. It 
will also reduce borrowing costs as increased competition would diminish the 
associated deadweight costs.  
Government’s investment plans in sectors relating to health, education and 
physical  infrastructure  should  be  clearly  prioritised  and  planned  under  a 
medium-term framework, preferably over five years or more. Under-investment 
in these sectors would impinge on growth and the quality of life, which would 
create more incentives for the labour force to migrate. All this should factor in 
the need to co-finance EU funds and the reform of the public sector pension 
system.  Further  reform  of  public  expenditure  is  a  must,  for  there  is  still 
considerable misuse of public resources. 
Increasing the absorption rate of EU funds should be a priority for any 
political party in power. These represent a one-off capital transfer from abroad 
and  could,  if  used  properly,  enhance  massively  both  human  and  physical 
domestic capital. Romania has the lowest rate of EU absorption funds among the 
EU accession countries. At mid 2011 Romanian managed to absorb only 3.7% 
of the total available funds for the 2007-2013 period. The use of these funds 
could increase economic growth potential of the economy in the long term. 
Involving  the  private  sector  more  in  the  debate  on  economic  policies  would 
benefit authorities by an increased poll of practical knowledge. For instance, a 
project initiated by the Foreign Investors Council (FIC) in Romania at the end of THE ROMANIAN ECONOMY FOUR YEARS AFTER THE EU ACCESSION   47 
 
2010
36 outlined several areas of action detailing specific measures aimed at re -
launching economic growth. Subsequent cooperation between FIC members and 
government authorities led to implementations of several proposed measures. 
Enhancing the dialogue betw een private and public sector in this way could 
strengthen the process of decision making by delivering suitable economic 
policies which would support economic growth. 
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